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As private sector interest and involvement in corrections in-
creases, more state and local governments are likely to receive offers
for the private construction, management and operation of adult cor-
rectional facilities. Although the success of the concept has yet to be
proved,1 the increase in state and local prison populations, over-
crowded and antiquated facilities, fiscal restraints, and resulting
management difficulties may persuade government officials to em-
brace the privitization opportunity.
Until recently, private sector involvement in corrections was
minimal. A privitization study conducted for the National Institute
of Justice found that most private contracting occurs in the juvenile
justice field,' primarily for such services as medical care, educational
and vocational training, and staff training.' A significant number of
juveniles are housed in privately operated facilities throughout the
country.4
Private participation in adult corrections in the private sector
has primarily involved provision of specific services, as in the juvenile
field, and minimum security pre-release facilities such as halfway
houses.5 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), an ex-
ception to this minimal involvement, utilizes private contractors to
detain its growing illegal alien population. However, the INS experi-
* Counsel, Pennsylvania House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, J.D., Dickinson
School of Law, 1983.
The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Michael A. Finio, Esquire.
I. Mullen, "Corrections and the Private Sector", NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE-
RESEARCH IN BRIEF, Oct. 1984, at 102. [hereinafter cited as Corrections and the Private
Sector].
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4. A 1983 U.S. Department of Justice survey found 1,877 private residential
programs holding a total of 31,390 juveniles. Forty-seven of these were classified as "strict
security" and 426 as "medium security".
5. Corrections and the Private Sector, supra note I, at 2.
ence is of little help in traditional corrections systems, since illegal
aliens typically are held for short periods of time in minimum secur-
ity environments. Furthermore, the nature of illegal alien confine-
ment results in little need for the types of programs and services
most prisons6 provide.
This article will provide a practical guide for corrections offi-
cials, state and local government executives, and state legislators fac-
ing the privitization of corrections issue. It will discuss the compo-
nents of Pennsylvania's enabling legislation and the related legal
issues which warrant consideration.
II. Background
Despite initial hesitations, privitization is on the increase. Na-
tionally, several local governments have contracted with private pris-
ons in the past two years. Since 1984, the Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA), a for-profit corporation, has been operating Hamil-
ton County, Tennessee's 300-bed adult detention center.7 CCA re-
cently offered to operate Tennessee's entire corrections system,8 al-
though the state's legislature has not as yet considered the proposal.
The Volunteers of America (VOA), a non-profit agency, operates a
42-bed medium security regional correctional facility for women in
Rosedale, Minnesota." According to a recent report, VOA currently
has contracts with two other Minnesota counties and the federal gov-
ernment, and noncontractual agreements with several other counties,
to provide incarceration at the Rosedale facility on an "as needed"
basis."
A minimum security private facility for short-term county pris-
oners presently operates in Armstrong County, Pennsylvania. 1 The
"268 Center", a for-profit corporation, houses inmates of Allegheny
and Tioga counties, with a current population of six. 2 Allegheny
6. Id. at 3. A recently-opened detention facility may present a new model for Immi-
gration and Naturalization Services (INS) confinement. A private provider, Human Resources
Inc., contracted with the Public Health Service and INS and renovated the former Cumber-
land County, Pennsylvania Prison built in the eighteenth century, to house mentally ill Cuban
aliens who cannot be returned to Cuba and are unsuitable for community placement. It is
speculated that the length of stay of the residents could far exceed the average alien detention
rate.
7. PA. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET AND FINANCE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON PRIVATE PRISONS
(Oct., 1985). [hereinafter cited as LBFC REPORT]. The facility houses state inmates serving
up to six years for felonies, county inmates serving less than one year for misdemeanors, and
drunk driving offenders serving mandatory forty-eight hour sentences.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 25. The Volunteers of America has a history of operating halfway houses.
10. Id.
II. Telephone interview with Gary Taylor, Director of the "268 Center" (Dec. 10,
1985).
12. ld.
County utilizes the facility as part of a plan to avoid violating a
federal district court order which limits the number of inmates who
may be incarcerated in the county jail."s Butler County, Pennsylva-
nia, employs Mr. Charles Fenton, a former federal prison warden, as
the private warden of its county jail."' Fenton's initial offer to the
county entailed his management of the jail with a staff of private
prison guards. 5 While the county was willing to accept the proposal,
the unionized prison guards were successful in obtaining an injunc-
tion which prohibits the county from terminating its contract with
the guards' union.16 As a result, Mr. Fenton is the prison's only pri-
vate employee.
Two states have enacted legislation authorizing public sector
use of private prisons. Texas' enabling statute authorizes counties to
contract for the incarceration of low risk inmates in private detention
facilities.' New Mexico has a more detailed statutory scheme. 8 As
of August 1985, no private prison facilities were operating in either
state.' 9 Pennsylvania is considering legislation 0 in response to opera-
tion of the "268 Center" and the two situations presented by Fenton.
The first Fenton proposal led to Fenton's appointment as Butler
County's warden.2' The second presented a far more complex prob-
lem for state legislators and corrections officials. Fenton desired to
operate "Riverhaven", a western Pennsylvania22 facility designed as
a maximum security prison for 720 protective custody inmates from
a number of states. 23 The addition of an interstate factor magnifies
the policy questions and the practical problems regarding private
prisons.
The fundamental and perhaps most difficult question in this
area is whether a traditional government function such as imprison-
13. Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 565 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Pa.
1983). Judge Cohill, who entered the order, inspected the "268 Center" and approved its use
for housing Allegheny County prisoners. In addition to utilizing the "268 Center", the scheme
for reduction of the prison's population includes revised bail practices, placement of inmates in
other county jails (with a per diem fee arrangement), construction of a 140-bed supplemental
jail, and an end to the practice of housing state prisoners in the county jail while they are on
trial for subsequent offenses in Allegheny County. Telephone interview with Ed Feinstein,
Esq., Neighborhood Legal Services of Pittsburgh (Dec. 13, 1985).
14. Telephone interview with Butler County Jail shift supervisor (Dec. 12, 1985).
15. Id.
16. District Council of AFSCME v. Butler County, Pa., No. 85-036 (Ct. Common
Pleas of Butler County, Sept. 27, 1985) (order granting preliminary injunction).
17. 81 TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5115(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
18. 1984 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1985).
19. LBFC REPORT at 25.
20. H. 307, P.N. 2460, (Pennsylvania House of Representatives 1985).
21. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
22. Private Prisons, 1985: Hearing on H. 158 Before Pa. House Judiciary Comm.
1985-86 Ses. (1985) [hereinafter cited as House Hearing] (statement of Charles Fenton, War-
den, Butler County Jail).
23. Id.
ment should be delegated to a private entity. For example, certain
government officials believe that government has a duty to guarantee
that services are provided, not to provide all services.24 Others think
that certain government functions, e.g., health services, job training
and transportation, are more amenable to private sector involvement.
Additionally, private prison operation raises serious questions which
do not exist in other government service areas. In no other setting do
private actors have such complete control over individuals' liberty,
including the capacity to inflict punishment. Commercial operation
of prisons risks sacrifice of inmates' constitutional rights to the pri-
mary commercial goal: profit. Consequently, it is imperative that
governments oversee privately operated prisons. One commentator
recently cautioned that:
Addressing the issue of "who's in charge" requires clearly
defining the roles and responsibilities in the contract document
and continuing efforts to communicate and review performance
expectations. While quality control is inherently more difficult
when the government is dealing with an independent provider
and can exert only indirect control, corrections departments re-
main accountable for contracted services and will be faced with
the need to adapt their supervisory practices in order to create
an effective public-private alliance."'
To further ensure accountability of private providers, some sug-
gest that governments establish written inmate complaint proce-
dures, provide inmate access to mechanisms for monitoring abuse,
and conduct periodic inmate surveys.27 Governments must also spec-
ify limitations and guidelines for the security/law enforcement as-
pect of the private provider's role. For example, it is vitally impor-
tant to apprise private prison operators and their employees of the
legal constraints on their ability to use force and deadly force. 8 Ad-
ditionally, the ability to impose discipline and the permissible types
of discipline must be clearly delineated. Failure to impose these limi-
tations by statute, regulation or contract increases the potential for
violations of inmates' constitutional rights and subsequent govern-
ment liability.29
Public groups are cautiously approaching the private prison is-
sue. In March 1985, the National Governors' Association (NGA)
24. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at 26, col. 3.
25. These views were expressed by various members of the Pennsylvania House Judici-
ary Committee during its consideration of private prison legislation.
26. Corrections and the Private Sector, supra note 1, at 6.
27. Id.
28. See infra notes 141-153 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 183-201 and accompanying text.
adopted a resolution declaring that states may wish to explore privi-
tization.3 0 However, the resolution cautions that states must ap-
proach such endeavors with "great care and forethought," since "the
private sector must not be viewed as any easy means for dealing with
the difficult problem of prison overcrowding." 3'
Similarly, the American Correctional Association (ACA) issued
a National Correctional Policy on private sector involvement in cor-
rections advocating a prudent examination of the issue. ACA, em-
phasizing government's ultimate authority and responsibility for cor-
rections, urges that the decision to pursue privitization must
guarantee that such services "meet professional standards, provide
necessary public safety, provide services equal to or better than gov-
ernment, and be cost-effective compared to well-managed govern-
mental operations." '32 While the ACA's Delegate Assembly adopted
the policy, corrections managers generally are skeptical of
privitization.33
Not all public sector groups share the NGA's and the ACA's
cautious optimism. For example, the National Sheriff's Association
has voiced strong opposition to privitization of prisons.34 Prison
guards, who share a similar vested interest in continued public prison
operation, have also reacted negatively to the concept.3 5
Private groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and the Pennsylvania Prison Society remain vehemently
opposed to private prisons. Recently, before Pennsylvania's House
Judiciary Committee, those groups argued that governments should
not utilize privitization to abate prison overcrowding,3" questioning
whether commercial motives are compatible with the administration
of justice.3" The ACLU in particular raised extensive concerns about
government's responsibility and liability for the actions of private
providers.38 The public, which normally opposes prison construction
plans, is even more concerned with the potential threats posed by
30. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, at 26, col. 3.
31. Id.
32. RATIFIED CORRECTIONAL PUBLIC POLICIES, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSN. (Jan.
20, 1985).
33. The writer's experience with meeting corrections officials from across the country is
that there are few who would contract with private providers for the complete management
and operation of a correctional facility.
34. Corrections and the Private Sector, supra note 1, at 1.
35. House Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Richard Bloomingdale, Director of
Legislation, Council 13 of The American Federation of State County and Municipal Employ-
ees (AFSCME)).
36. House Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Patricia Schudler, Pennsylvania
Prison Society).
37. Id.
38. House Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Stefan Presser, Legal Director, Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania).
privately operated prisons.39
With the possibility of two private prisons beginning operation
in the foreseeable future, the Pennsylvania legislature considered all
of these factors. The first bill presented to the general assembly was
introduced by the representative of the district in which the "268
Center" is located.4 ° This bill called for a moratorium on the opera-
tion of private prisons.41 The second bill, advocated by the represen-
tative from the district in which Fenton's Riverhaven facility was
proposed,' 2 authorized local and state governments to contract with
private providers for the management and operation of prisons.43
Some legislators favored complete private sector involvement,
relying on private business' ability to operate free from the con-
straints which bind governments. For example, private prisons will
allow some state governments to avoid the difficult problem of voter
approval for bond issues for prison construction, providing instead
for contracting and lease-back arrangements. Private providers are
not burdened with cumbersome state acquisition procedures and
need not deal with civil service systems and in some states unionized
labor. Furthermore, advocates of privitization argue that most state
and county prisons are far from models of efficiency. Given the will-
ingness of certain entrepreneurs to meet both ACA standards and
the requirements of Pennsylvania's legislation, these legislators advo-
cate giving privitization a chance to "prove itself."
Other legislators, who did not support all aspects of privitiza-
tion, recognized that the issues of oversight, accountability, potential
abuse and crisis management are magnified in terms of a maximum
security private facility. They were successful in designing enabling
legislation which limits the use of private prisons to the incarceration
of pretrial detainees and inmates serving sentences for misdemeanors
and summary offenses.
III. Pennsylvania's Private Prison Enabling Legislation
Faced with the task of drafting legislation to authorize opera-
39. House Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Ruth Gibbons and Agnes Sayers).
These residents of the area in which a maximum security private prison was proposed stressed
strong concerns about safety - their community has only a part-time police force - and
uncertainty as to training requirements and skills of private prison employees.
40. Rep. David Wright introduced the bill.
41. H. 307, P.N. 337 (Pennsylvania House of Representatives 1985) (hereinafter cited
as H. 307]. Initially, the moratorium was to have remained in effect until completion of a
study by the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee. Subsequently, the moratorium was
limited to six months.
42. Rep. Ralph Pratt. The locality in western Pennsylvania is suffering from a high
rate of unemployment. Thus, there was a considerable amount of public interest in the creation
of new jobs.
43. H. 158, P.N. 172 (Pa. House 1985).
tion of private prisons, Pennsylvania's legislators examined New
Mexico's legislation. A fairly detailed statute enacted in 1984, 4 it
amended the state's existing corrections statute by adding a "private
prison" category. It authorizes two "pilot projects" prior to July 1,
1987,' 5 with contracts limited to three years duration. 4" The statute
does not authorize the state to contract for private prison services -
only counties and municipalities are granted this option. 47 However,
counties and municipalities do not have unfettered discretion, since
the state's Attorney General must "select, authorize and approve the
pilot projects. '48  The Attorney General must also monitor the
projects and report their progress to the state legislature.4 9
While some features of the New Mexico statute were not rele-
vant to Pennsylvania's corrections system,50 other components re-
flecting sound public policy were incorporated into the Pennsylvania
legislation.
A. Mandatory Contract Terms
Under the New Mexico scheme, the Attorney General and the
Local Government Division of the Department of Finance Adminis-
tration must approve, in writing, all private prison contracts. 51 Dis-
approval may be based on a number of factors which have also been
incorporated into Pennsylvania's legislation.52 Additionally, the Risk
Management Division of the General Services Department must re-
view contracts to ensure proper assumption of liability by the private
provider and adequacy of liability insurance.
53
Pennsylvania's House Bill 307 merges the duties of New Mex-
ico's Attorney General, Local Government Division and Risk Man-
agement Divisions into one assignment for the Commonwealth's At-
torney General.54 Approval by the Attorney General is partially
44. See 1984 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-3-1 - 3-28 (Supp. 1985).
45. Id. § 33-3-1(B).
46. Id. § 33-3-27(A).
47. Id. § 33-3-26(A).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 33-3-26(B). The report must contain an analysis "of the private projects, their
success or failure, recommendations for modification or repeal of the law and suggestions for
change in any future projects." Id.
50. Unlike Pennsylvania, local governments in New Mexico are restricted in their abil-
ity to incur indebtedness beyond a five year period. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-11 (1978).
However, local governments are exempt from this debt limitation for the provision or operation
of a private prison. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-12 (Supp. 1985).
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(B) (Supp. 1985).
52. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
53. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(E) (Supp. 1985).
54. This delegation of authority is consistent with Pennsylvania's Commonwealth's At-
torney Act which requires the Attorney General to review all contracts executed by state agen-
cies. Act of Oct. 15, 1980, P. L. No. 164-950, § 204, codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 732-
204(F) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
conditioned upon the inclusion of the following contract terms:5"
(1) The posting of an adequate performance bond by the private
contractor. 56 (2) Proof of adequate insurance.57 (3) A clause re-
quiring the private contractor to comply with Department of
Corrections regulations and with the Act.58(4) A requirement
that the contract be approved by the Attorney General.59(5) A
plan developed by the private contractor detailing all aspects of
operations in the private correctional facility or in the provision
of security services.60(6) A requirement of annual contract re-
view by the Attorney General.6"
In addition, the Attorney General's approval is contingent on
the following:
62
(1) The private contractor's assumption of liability caused
by or arising out of all aspects of the ownership or operation of
the private correctional facility or the provision of security ser-
vices, including, but not limited to, escape or other emergency
situations, legal fees and damage awards, involving the private
contractor and the contracting government body.6"
(2) Liability insurance covering the private contractor and
its officers, employees and agents in an amount sufficient to
cover liability caused by or arising out of the ownership or oper-
ation of a private correctional facility or the provision of security
services. A copy of the proposed insurance policy for the first
year shall be submitted for approval with the contract, and no
contract shall be valid or enforceable without prior approval.
64
55. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27 (Supp. 1984).
56. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(A)(1). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(B)
(1978).
57. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(A)(2). This term reflects the approval requirements
for adequacy of liability insurance.
58. Id. Although New Mexico does not require a similar contract term, it does require
inspections of private prisons by the governing bodies of its counties and municipalities. 1984
N.M. Laws Ch. 22 § 33-3-4.
59. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(A)(4). New Mexico does not require a similar con-
tract term.
60. Id. at § 4(A)(5). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(D) (1978), which requires
all private prison contracts to contain "comprehensive standards for conditions of incarcera-
tion, either by setting them forth in full as part of the contract or by reference to known and
respected compilations of such standards."
61. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(A)(6). New Mexico does not require a similar con-
tract term. However, its statute requires the Attorney General to periodically monitor its pri-
vate prisons. See supra N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-26(B).
62. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(B).
63. Id. at § 4(B)(1). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(E)(1), which places this
obligation upon the Risk Management Division of New Mexico's General Services Depart-
ment. Pennsylvania's legislation expanded the clause to provide specific examples of situations
in which the private provider must assume liability.
64. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(B)(2). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(E)(3).
The only difference is that New Mexico's review requirement applies to its Risk Management
Division of the General Services Department.
House Bill 307 provides that a contract may be disapproved
upon "any reasonable grounds," including but not limited to:
(1) Inadequacy or inappropriateness of the proposed plan of op-
eration.65(2) Failure to meet department regulations.e6 (3) Un-
suitability of the proposed private contractor or its employ-
ees.6"(4) Absence of required or desirable contract
provisions.68(5) Unavailability of adequate funds."(6) Lack of
proof of appropriate insurance.
7 0
B. Grounds for Termination of Contract
House Bill 30771 adopts New Mexico's requirement of a "termi-
nation for cause" clause with 90 days notice to the private pro-
vider.7 2 Both also specify non-exhaustive grounds for termination:
(1) Failure to be licensed or to comply with regulations of the
department.73(2) Failure to meet other contract provisions.7 '(3)
Failure to meet the provisions of the Act.
75
65. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(C)(1). See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(B).
66. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(C)(2). New Mexico's statute does not require state
regulation of private prisons. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
67. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(C)(3). See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(B). This
clause is particularly important given the possibility that a private provider or its employees
may have criminal history records or prior employment history information which indicates
unsuitability for prison management or staffing. The privately-employed warden of the "268
Center" was discharged from his prior position as a county jail warden for wrongfully taking
money from the commissary account. House Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Gary Tay-
lor, "268 Center"). This clause enables the Attorney General to consider any civil verdicts
(most notably, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions) entered against private providers in previous positions
as government employees. Governments' ultimate liability for the actions of private providers
requires serious investigation and consideration of such information.
68. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(C)(4). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(B).
69. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(C)(5). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. 22 § 33-3-27(B).
70. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(C)(5). This is implied in § 4 (C)(2).
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(F).
72. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(D).
73. Id. at § 4(D)(1). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(F)(I), which allows termi-
nation for the independent contractor's failure to meet the minimum standards and conditions
of incarceration, which the contract must specify or reference. Rather than include this ground
for termination, H. 307 allows termination for failure to comply with regulations. The bill
requires the state Department of Corrections to promulgate private prison regulations which
must include minimum standards for the care of inmates, the protection of inmates' rights, the
staff, the availability of mental health services and the physical structure and operation of the
private correctional facility. H. 307, § 12(2).
74. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(D)(2). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(F)(2),
which qualifies this clause with "when such failure seriously affects the operation of the jail."
The Department of Corrections must also notify the contracting government if it discovers a
violation of a contract clause through its inspection of the private facility. H. 307, supra note
41 at § 13.
75. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 4(D)(3). New Mexico's statute does not contain such
language.
C. Licensure and Inspection
Any statutory scheme authorizing private prisons operation
should designate a governmental entity responsible for licensure and
inspection of the facilities. While it does not have a prison licensure
procedure, New Mexico designates county and municipality "gov-
erning bodies" to inspect all publicly-operated jails at least twice a
year.76 New Mexico applies the same system to its private prisons.
As with public prisons, inspectors must report on the prison(s) within
their jurisdiction to the county district court, and appear before the
court if any applicable statutes have been violated. 77 If a violation is
reported, the district court judge must order the district attorney to
commence an action for the violation and failure to discharge duty
against the sheriff, jail administrator or independent contractor.7 8
Unlike New Mexico, Pennsylvania did not amend its existing
prison inspection and regulation statutes79 when designing this or
any other aspect of its private prison legislation. Current Pennsylva-
nia law requires the state and county correctional facility superin-
tendents to submit comprehensive biannual reports to the Depart-
ment of Corrections on their facilities' physical conditions and
inmate population demographics.80 The Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections is responsible for inspecting and classifying all county
jails. 81 Inspections are based on minimum standards for county jails
promulgated by the Department, 2 and classification depends on sat-
isfactory inspection. 83 No regulations or administrative directives de-
fine grounds for denial of a classification, ' and no statutory enforce-
ment provision compels the Department to bring an action for
compliance when a jail violates regulations. However, in a case of
first impression, Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Court reversed two
classifications of a county jail granted by the Bureau of Corrections8"
and ordered that the jail be given the lowest possible classification.8
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-4.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 1-2191 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 31 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
81. Id. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 § 460.3(4) (Purdon Supp. 1985). This Act
requires the Department of Justice to classify county jails as eligible to receive prisoners sen-
tenced to maximum terms of six months or more but less than five years.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 460.3(3).
83. Id. at § 460.3(4).
84. See Inmates of Cumberland County Prison v. Dep't of Justice of Pa., 75 Pa.
Cmwlth. 591, 462 A.2d 937 (1983), affd 503 Pa. 89, 468 A.2d 747 (1983).
85. The "Bureau of Corrections" was elevated to Department level in 1984. See Act of
Dec. 30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 245-1299, § I, codified at § I PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 61 (Purdon
Supp. 1985).
86. Inmates of Cumberland County Prison v. Comm. of Pa. Dep't of Justice, 71 Pa.
Commw. 58, 454 A.2d 653 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). Inmates of the Cumberland County jail
Pennsylvania's Health Care Facilities Act, 7 a model for govern-
ment regulation of a private sector-provided service, served as a pro-
totype for the private prison legislation. Just as the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Health has jurisdiction over private nursing homes,
House Bill 307 gives the Department of Corrections the licensing
and inspection authority over private prisons. If the private provider
applicant presents a contract approved by the Attorney General,88
and has met all statutory and regulatory requirements, the Depart-
ment of Corrections may license the facility,89 specifying the maxi-
mum inmate population for the facility.90 The Department also has
the discretion to establish licensure and inspection fees.91
House Bill 307 mandates annual inspections of private correc-
tional facilities by the Department of Corrections. Within sixty days
of the inspection, the private contractor must receive an inspection
report. 92 The Department then has the discretion to grant the con-
tractor a "reasonable period of time" to correct deficiencies and/or
comply with regulations.9" If the contractor fails to do either, the
Department may revoke the license, after a hearing under Pennsyl-
vania's administrative procedures law.9" Department personnel may
also make unannounced inspections of private prisons.9 5
Pennsylvania formerly designated state legislators, members of
the judiciary, officers of the executive branch and members of the
Pennsylvania Prison Society as official visitors to its correctional fa-
cilities.96 House Bill 307 specifies that official visitors may interview
sought to reverse two classifications, granted by the Bureau of Corrections in 1980 and 1981,
which certified the jail as suitable for housing inmates sentenced up to five years, despite nu-
merous serious violations of minimum standards. The violations included: 1) inadequate
amounts of hot water for showers; 2) no screening of food workers for communicable diseases;
3) inadequate recreation for inmates; 4) antiquated padlock systems; 5) wood construction
which constituted immediate fire and safety hazards; 6) the temporary holding cell was not
equipped with water or toilet facilities; and 7) cluttered, dirty conditions. The court reversed
the classifications and ordered the Bureau to classify the jail to receive prisoners sentenced to a
maximum term of six months. The court's ability to order appropriate relief was limited by the
classification statute, which does not grant the Bureau the discretion to close a jail. See supra
note 8 I.
87. Act of July 19, 1979, Pub. L. No. 48-130, § 801-813, codified at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 448.101-448.904 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
88. See supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
89. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 5(B).
90. Id. at § 5(B).
91. Id. at § 5(D). This provision was added at the recommendation of Mr. Anthony
Travisano, Executive Director of the American Correctional Association. See House Hearing,
supra note 22 (statement of Anthony Travisano).
92. H. 307, P.N. 2460 § 10(A) (Pa. House 1985).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at § 10(B).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 53 (Purdons 1974). Repealed by Act of Oct. 4, 1978, Pub.
L. No. 909, No. 173-909 § 9. The official visitation law was inadvertently repealed by Pennsyl-
vania's Equal Rights Amendment Enabling legislation. Despite attempts to reinstate it, dis-
agreements between the Governor's Office and legislators on the limits to be placed on visitors
inmates in private and may enter the cell unless the superintendent
determines that it would be dangerous either to the visitor or to the
discipline of the institution. 97 In such case, the superintendent must
provide another room in which to conduct the visit.9 8 Official visitors
are subject to criminal penalties for assisting inmates in escape, pro-
viding weapons for escape and making contraband available to in-
mates.99 Private prison managers may seek a court order to deny
official visitors access to facilities if they violate the established
limits. 00
Relying on the nursing home model, House Bill 307 also re-
quires the Department of Corrections to establish procedures for li-
cense revocation.' 0 ' The grounds for revocation include, but are not
limited to:
(1) Violation of the private prison act or regulations. (2) Fraud
or misrepresentation. (3) Failure to maintain adequate insur-
ance. (4) Gross incompetence or negligence. (5) Moral turpi-
tude. (6) Violation of other laws of the Commonwealth. (7) Vio-
lation of civil rights of an individual inmate. (8) Failure to
comply with official inspection reports of the Department.'0 2
D. Regulation
Following the Health Care Facilities Act model, the Depart-
ment of Corrections also has the authority to regulate private pris-
ons. There are several components to the regulatory provision. First,
the Department may determine the types of inmates inappropriate
for housing in a private prison, based on the violent nature of the
offense and prior violent behavior.'03 Second, the Department must
establish minimum standards for "the care of inmates, the protection
of inmates' rights, the staff, the availability of mental health ser-
vices, the physical structure and operation" of private prisons.
10 4
have prevented its re-enactment.
97. H. 307, P.N. 2460 § 1 (B) (Pennsylvania House of Representatives 1985).
98. Id.
99. Id. at § I I(C).
100. Id. at § 1 I(D). The private contractor must apply to the court of common pleas of
the judicial district in which the facility is located for an order to show cause why the official
visitor should not be denied official visitor status.
101. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 14(A). The revocation procedure must include notice
and hearing pursuant to 2 PA. CON. STAT. Ch. 5 Subch. A (Relating to practice and procedure
of commonwealth agencies) and Ch. 7 Subch. A (Relating to judicial review of Common-
wealth agency action).
102. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 14(B)(l)-(8). These grounds reflect those which consti-
tute cause for termination of the contract by the contracting government and the grounds for
which the Attorney General may disapprove the contract. See id. at § 4(C) and (D).
103. Id. at § 12(l). The stated intent of this section is to ensure that only inmates suita-
ble for minimum security facilities are housed in private correctional facilities.
104. Id. at § 12(2). This charge envisions a comprehensive set of regulations similar to
Some authorities suggest that the Commission on Accreditation for
Corrections' minimum standards should be adopted.105 If not, the
minimum standards should reflect those established for state correc-
tional institutions and county jails. 10 6
Third, the Department must promulgate regulations providing
training programs for corrections officers employed by private con-
tractors.0 7 Last, the Department must certify successful completion
of the training program as a prerequisite for employment as a cor-
rections officer.108
E. Who May be Confined in Private Prisons
House Bill 307 limits the use of private correctional services to
incarceration of pretrial detainees'0 9 and persons sentenced for mis-
demeanors and summary offenses." 0 In direct response to the pro-
posed Riverhaven facility,"' the bill prohibits placement of out-of-
state inmates." 2 The Department of Corrections may further ex-
clude placement of certain offenders." 8 Finally, the definition of pri-
vate correctional facility excludes pre-release centers which operate
under contracts with the Department of Corrections.""
those existing for state correctional institutions. The regulations encompass inmate mail, visita-
tion privileges, incoming publications, religious activities, telephone calls, inmate complaints,
inmate discipline, housing, care and treatment. 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 93.1-13. (Shepard's
1984).
105. House Hearing, supra note 22 (statements of Charles Fenton and Thomas E.
Egan, Pa. Assoc. on Probation, Parole and Correction). The standards provide correctional
administrators with a nationally recognized framework for upgrading and improving prisons
and are regarded as a basic minimum to which every prison should conform.
106. Failing to do so would create the possibility of both lesser quality services and
programs in private prisons and equal protection claims by inmates incarcerated therein. Ap-
plication of the Commission for Accreditation for Corrections' minimum standards to private
prisons could have the reverse effect. Inmates housed in public prisons which are not accred-
ited might bring equal protection claims in this regard.
107. H. 307, P.N. 2460 § 5(E) (Pennsylvania House of Representatives 1985).
108. Id. The bill requires the private contractor to incur the cost of training its em-
ployee. This subsection is modeled after New Mexico's statute. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-
27(C). However, New Mexico requires that minimum training standards and the responsibility
of the independent contractor for payment of such training must be contained in the contract.
109. Id. at § 2. "Detentioners" are individuals who are "incarcerated while awaiting
criminal trial before a court of common pleas for a violation of 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. (Relating
to Crimes and Offenses), subject to Pa. R. Crim. P. 1100, Regarding Prompt Trial. The term
excludes a juvenile, an individual charged with an offense excluded by the Department or
otherwise considered unsuitable by the Department, pursuant to Department regulations under
section 12(l); and an individual incarcerated for an offense who is awaiting trial for a separate
offense."
110. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 3(A). Effectively, this limitation makes private prisons
available primarily to counties, since most prison inmates are felons. Telephone interview with
Scott Thornsley, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Dec. 18, 1985).
Ill. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
112. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 3(C).
113. Id. at § 12(l).
114. Id. at § 2. Pre-release centers may only accept inmates who meet the participation
standards set by the Department of Corrections. Furthermore, the pre-release law applies to
the Department's population - most of whom are excluded from private prisons because of
IV. Relationship of Enabling Legislation to Other State Laws
Other state laws may require amendment to provide a statutory
framework which will facilitate the operation of private prisons.
A. Sentencing and Good Time
Pennsylvania's sentencing statute would not prevent a judge
from sentencing an inmate to a private correctional facility." 5 Other
states may face this obstacle. Sentencing a defendant to a private
facility without the statutory authority to do so may create grounds
for challenging the sentence.
Pennsylvania does not have a "good time" statute." 6 For those
states in which good time statutes are in effect, an important ques-
tion in privitization discussions is who should compute the good
time? Existing systems require the superintendent or the warden to
make the computation." 7 New Mexico's private prison statute re-
quires the private prison warden to report disciplinary infractions
and good behavior to the county sheriff, who has sole authority to
grant or deny good time. 118 Some states allow earned good time to
be taken away from an inmate who becomes involved in a serious
infraction or series of infractions. 19 Even though a state may require
government officials to compute good time, private providers' abili-
ties to charge inmates with disciplinary infractions gives them a sub-
stantial amount of influence over good time systems. Therefore, it is
essential that the discretion be no greater than a public warden's and
be closely monitored.
B. Pre-release and Work Release
Pennsylvania's Commissioner of Corrections has authority to
transfer inmates from any pre-release center "located in any State or
Regional Penal or Correctional Institution" under his supervision to
community-based pre-release centers. 20 Once at the pre-release
their felony convictions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 § 1052(a), and 1053 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
115. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9756 (1985). When imposing a sentence of total confine-
ment, the court may sentence the defendant to a "correctional or other appropriate
institution."
116. Good time statutes allow for deductions from an inmate's sentence for good behav-
ior. The manner in which the deductions are made vary. Some states provide a flat number of
days per month while others allow accelerated deductions based upon the length of time
served. Compare OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2967 (Baldwin 1979) with IOWA CODE ANN. §
903A.3 (West 1985).
117. See infra notes 118-119.
118. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-8.
119. IOWA CODE ANN. § 903A.3 (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5265 (1984);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1403 (Callaghan 1985).
120. Act of July 16, 1968, Pub. L. No. 173-351, § 2(b), codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
61, § 1052 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
center, inmates may be placed in vocational or technical training
programs, academic programs, or employment programs.121 Inmates
housed in private correctional facilities should be afforded the same
opportunity for placement in pre-release centers. Pennsylvania's ex-
isting laws require amendment to grant the Commissioner of Correc-
tions similar authority over private prison inmates. Any amendment
should prevent private prisons from placing inmates in work release
settings unless corrections officials approve the inmates and the pro-
grams. Wages earned by inmates on work release may be subject to
restraints on disposition. For example, Pennsylvania law requires
that inmates' wages be applied to their board at the pre-release
center, travel expenses to work, and support of dependents.122 These
same restrictions will apply to inmates of private prisons if they are
placed in work release programs.
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C. Inmate Labor and Work Products
Several factors pertaining to inmate labor are of particular sig-
nificance when considering the privitization of corrections. First,
statutory or regulatory requirements may establish inmate wage
schedules. 2" The consequences of a private prison contractor failing
to pay the required wage are obvious.1 25 Similar problems may arise
when private facility inmates have the opportunity to receive sub-
stantially higher wages than their public prison counterparts. An im-
portant related question which must be addressed is whether inmates
working in private prisons are entitled to minimum wage?
Second, if the private prison operator intends to sell inmate-
made goods in the open market, state and federal limitations may
present substantial impediments. Many states ban sale of inmate-
made goods to the public. 26 Some of these bans apply not only to in-
state inmate goods but also to goods made in other states which are
transported for sale into the state. 27 Pennsylvania, for example, pro-
hibits in-state sale of goods made by inmates of other states.12 8
121. Id. (c).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 1054 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
123. Id. The statute speaks to inmates "gainfully employed under any plan established
under the act." Therefore, the wages of any private prison inmate placed in a Department of
Corrections-approved work release program must be disposed of pursuant to the statute.
124. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 816.
125. Such situations might create poor morale among inmates working in public correc-
tion facilities. Poor morale usually contributes to management difficulties and potential secur-
ity problems.
126. These limitations arose after the Depression, when states tried to prevent competi-
tion between inmate labor and the private sector workforce.
127. Congress sanctioned restraints upon interstate commerce upon enactment of the
Hawes-Cooper Act, 49 USC § 60, June 19, 1929. Whitfield v. State of Ohio, 297 U.S. 431
(1936).
128. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7307 (1985). Violators are subject to a maximum fine of
Other states have no restrictions on the sale of inmate-made
goods, 29 while some allow sale to the private sector with certain lim-
itations. Goods made by state prison inmates in Pennsylvania must
be "branded" with the phrase "convict made" and the identity of the
prison, 130 although in reality, inmate-manufactured goods are sold by
the State Department of Corrections to governmental agencies and
charities."'1 Pennsylvania's county prisons remain under more strin-
gent restraints. Under an 1897 statute, county wardens are prohib-
ited from employing more than ten percent of the prison population
to manufacture certain goods if the goods are manufactured else-
where in the state.' 32 Presumably, this restriction would apply to a
private prison contracting for services with counties.
Private prison contractors incarcerating federal inmates will be
subject to federal prison industry restrictions. Federal law requires
the Federal Prison Industries Corporation'33 to determine what in-
dustries will be conducted in the federal prison system. 34 The stat-
ute defining the powers and duties of the Federal Prison Industries
Corporation allows sales of prison goods to departments and agencies
of the United States Government, but prohibits sales "to the public
in competition with private enterprise."' 135
D. Interstate Corrections Compacts
Thirty-one states have "Interstate Corrections Compact" stat-
utes' 36 which enable sending party states to contract for confinement
of inmates by receiving party states.137 The Interstate Corrections
Compact Act clearly speaks in terms of "state" parties interacting
pursuant to contracts entered into under the Act. 38 Consequently,
an attempt by a state party to place an inmate in a private correc-
$5,000 and a maximum term of imprisonment of two years.
129. See, e.g. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 546-549 (West 1985).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 252 (Purdon 1964).
131. Interview with Scott Thornsley, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections in Harris-
burg, PA (Dec. 6, 1985).
132. Act of June 18, 1897, Pub. L. No. 170, § 2 codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §
181 (Purdon 1964). Furthermore, wardens may not employ more than five percent of the pop-
ulation for the manufacture of "brooms, brushes and hollowware". The restrictions do not
apply if the goods are to be used by the inmates or the county.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 4121 (West 1985) creates "Federal Prison Industries" as a government
corporation of the District of Columbia with six directors appointed by the President.
134. Id. at § 4122(a).
135. Id, at § 4124. Federal agencies and departments are obligated to purchase products
which they require from Federal Prison Industries. The cost for the goods may not exceed the
current market price.
136. Id. at 4122(a).
137. Act of Dec. 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 348-1075,§ 1, codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§ 1061 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
138. Act of Dec. 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 348-1075, § 2, codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§ 1062 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
tional facility in another state would be in violation of the Act.
While this possibility may seem remote, Fenton's Riverhaven facil-
ity13 9 presented this exact problem to Pennsylvania. Absent an
amendment to the Interstate Corrections Compact Act, it was ques-
tionable whether Riverhaven could accept custody of inmates from
other states. 140 Therefore, states contemplating out-of-state place-
ment of inmates in private prisons should determine if the receiving
state is a party to the Interstate Corrections Compact Act.
V. Private Corrections Officers
A. Use of Force
Since private correctional officers will undoubtedly confront sit-
uations in which they may need to use force, states should carefully
examine their statutory provisions on the use of force. Pennsylvania's
criminal code provides "Principles of justification" for the use of
both deadly and nondeadly force. 4" Certain provisions authorize the
use of force by correctional officers and prison wardens,142 while
others address the justifiable use of force for self-protection. 4 '
Pennsylvania's wardens and "authorized officials of correctional
institutions" may use force if it is necessary to enforce the rules and
procedures of the institution.14 4 A guard may use force, including
deadly force, to prevent an inmate's escape from a correctional insti-
tution. 15 Although the statute fails to define the terms "warden",
"authorized official" and "guard", the definition of "correctional in-
stitution" is broad enough to encompass private prisons. 146 There-
fore, in Pennsylvania, as in other states which follow the Model Pe-
nal Code, 14 7 amendment to include private prison guards within
these sections might not be necessary.
Laws other than criminal statutes may affect the powers of pri-
vate corrections officers. For example, Pennsylvania's prison statutes
designate all wardens and guards as "peace officers" in "guarding,
protecting and delivering prisoners, in protecting property and inter-
ests of the county, and in capturing and returning prisoners that may
139. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
140. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 1062 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
141. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 501-510 (Purdon 1985).
142. Id. at § 509.
143. Id. at § 505. The use of force for self protection is available to all actors, not just
correctional officers and wardens.
144. Id. at § 509(5). The degree of force may not be forbidden by law. If deadly force is
used, it must be justifiable under the law.
145. Id. at § 508(c)(2).
146. See id. at § 501 which defines "Correctional institution" "any penal institution,
penitentiary, state farm, reformatory, prison, jail, house of correction or other institution for
the incarceration or custody of persons under sentence for offenses."
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
have escaped."""' House Bill 307 designates private correctional of-
ficers as peace officers, and grants them the same powers," 9 thus
subjecting them to potential criminal liability for mistreatment of
inmates. 50
The necessity of vesting private corrections officers with law en-
forcement powers highlights the extreme importance of proper train-
ing. Such programs must inform private guards of the statutory limi-
tations upon their ability to use deadly and nondeadly force.
Training in weapons and the use of physical force, as well as training
for medical and mental health emergencies, crisis management tech-
niques, and institutional procedures must be provided.' 5 ' House Bill
307 mandates the Department of Corrections to establish a training
program for corrections officers employed by private contractors, 162
and precludes employment as a private prison guard unless the appli-
cant has completed the requisite training.'
B. The Right to Strike
Pennsylvania law prohibits strikes by correctional officers, 15'
and requires resolution of labor disputes through binding arbitra-
tion. 155 The need for this public policy is clear: if strikes were per-
mitted, the absence of a guard force in a prison would create a
threat of danger not only to the community but also to the staff and
inmates of the institution.
Although a state may foreclose strikes by public prison guards,
extension of this prohibition to private prison guards would be fore-
closed by recent National Labor Relations Board (Board) decisions.
Prior to 1979, the Board applied the "intimate connection" test to
determine whether a private employee whose employer was perform-
ing a governmental function was subject to the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' 56 The two-pronged "inti-
mate connection" test is established:
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1985)."Peace officer" is not statuto-
rily defined; nor does a statute exist which sets forth the powers and duties of a "peace of-
ficer". Rather, the term is used in statutes, as it is here, regarding wardens and guards to
confer upon them enumerated law enforcement powers.
149. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 7.
150. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (Purdon 1985). See also Commissioners v. Manlin,
270 Pa. Super. 290, 411 A.2d 532 (1979) (conviction of deputy prison warden who struck and
kicked inmates during disciplinary hearings upheld).
151. Ongoing inservice training is necessary to maintain skill and knowledge of these
issues.
152. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 5(E).
153. Id.
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.805 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
155. Id.
156. See Rural Fire Protection Co. and Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 216 N.L.R.B. 583
(1975).
(I) where the nonexempt employer retains sufficient control over
its employee's terms and conditions of employment so as to be
capable of effective bargaining with the employee's representa-
tive, and(2) where the employer retains such control, the focus
of necessity is on the nature of the relationship between the pur-
poses of the exempt institution and the services provided by the
nonexempt employers.
57
In Rural Fire Protection Company, the city of Scottsdale, Ari-
zona contracted with a private provider for firefighting, ambulance
and first aid services.' 58 When Rural Fire sought to represent some
of the private firefighters in a labor dispute, the Board applied the
"intimate connection" test to determine if it had jurisdiction. It
found one prong satisfied since the employer hired, disciplined, dis-
charged, and supervised the employees.' 59 Applying the second
prong, the Board found the provision of firefighting and related ser-
vices intimately related to Scottsdale's municipal purposes. 60 More-
over, the Board stated that these services were an "essential munici-
pal function."' 1 Since state and municipal governments are exempt
from NLRA coverage, the Board held that Rural Fire, in its unique
position as a private provider of an essential municipal service, was
also exempt.' 62 Consequently, its employees could not invoke the
protections of the NLRA.
Applied to private prisons, Rural Fire might result in private
guards being exempted from the NLRA's coverage, thus being de-
nied the right to strike. However, more recent Board decisions sug-
gest a contrary conclusion. In National Transportation Service, a
case involving private employer busing of public school students, the
Board abandoned the second prong of the "intimate connection"
test, holding that the first prong --- employer control over the em-
ployee - is the appropriate standard for determining NLRA juris-
diction. 63 In rejecting Rural Fire, the majority declared that
"[n]othing in the legislative history of this provision [discretionary
jurisdiction] indicates any congressional intent that the Board de-
cline to assert jurisdiction over any employer solely because of the
relationship between services it provides to an exempt entity and the
157. National Transportation Serv. 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
158. Rural Fire, 216 N.L.R.B. 584.
159. Id. at 584. As evidence of employer control, the Board found that the employer
provided its own pension plan and health and life insurance, and contributed toward work-
man's compensation for the employees. Its employees did not participate in any of the fringe
benefits available to city employees except that they are eligible for membership in the city
credit union. Id.
160. Id. at 586.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 586, 587.
163. National Transportation Serv. 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
purposes of such entity."1" The majority also rejected the argument
that private employees should be treated as public employees ex-
cluded from NLRA coverage "merely because they provide services
similar to those provided by public employees, ' 165 concluding that
the proper standard is the employer's ability to bargain effectively
with its employee's labor representative. 166
A strong dissent by Board members Murphy and Pinnello dis-
cussed the impact of National Transportation on governmental oper-
ations. Noting Congress' determination that it would not be in the
best interest of national labor policy to include governmental bodies
within the NLRA,' 71 they declared that "it would not be in the best
national interest for this Board to assert jurisdiction over employers
who, although not by definition excluded from the Act's coverage,
are nonetheless so closely related to exempt entities that the policy
considerations underlying the latter's exemption also apply to
them."' 68 The dissenters found that since busing was required by
state statute, private providers should share the governmental ex-
emption; to hold differently would grant the right to strike to these
private employees. Recalling Rural Fire they reasoned that:
To our knowledge, nowhere in the nation do municipal firemen
possess the legally recognized right to strike - for reasons too
obvious to require explanation. Yet the effect of the majority
decision is to grant that right to firefighters who, although di-
rectly employed by a private employer, provide exactly the same
protection to citizens of a community as firefighters who are em-
ployed by municipalities themselves. Indeed, nearly all public
employees, whether or not they have collective bargaining rights,
are forbidden to strike.' "
The issues raised by the National Transportation dissent are
relevant to the private prison concept. Absent either Congressional
action to clarify the status of contracted-for governmental services or
a shift in the thinking of Board members, private prison guards will
possess the right to strike. It is, therefore, essential that state ena-
bling legislation address the emergency posed by private prison
guard strikes.
House Bill 307 attempts to address the issue by requiring pri-
vate contractors to notify the Department of Corrections 60 days
prior to the termination of a labor contract with the private prison
164. Id.
165. Id. at 566, n.8.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 567.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 568.
and immediately if a strike occurs. 170 In the event of a strike, the bill
authorizes the state to operate the correctional institution until the
strike is resolved.171 Despite these protections, House Bill 307 fails to
provide for an emergency staff to run the struck facility. This failure
may be particularly critical if the private prison is in an area of the
state in which no government prison staff is located. Filling interim
managerial and operational gaps is similarly unaddressed in the
bill.172 Governments are well-advised to thoroughly explore these is-
sues before executing a contract with a private prison provider.
VI. Liability
In the year ending June 30, 1984, nearly 19,000 prisoners na-
tionwide filed 73 civil rights actions pursuant to Section 1983.7
Privitization raises at least two questions. First, will private
prison operators and employees be immune from Section 1983 ac-
tions? 17 5 Second, can state and local governments avoid Section 1983
liability by placing inmates in private prisons? While states are im-
mune from Section 1983 suits,176 state and local government offi-
cials 7 7 and municipalities178 are not. State and local officials are
subject to liability if they deprive a person of her constitutional
rights while acting under color of state law. 79 Municipalities can be
sued when the unconstitutional action occurs pursuant to an officially
adopted policy, ordinance, regulation or decision. 80 Federal govern-
ment officials are also subject to liability for violating an individual's
constitutional rights. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,8' the United States Supreme Court
recognized a right of action (Bivens actions) against federal employ-
170. H. 307, supra note 41 at § 8(a).
171. Id.
172. States should consider granting this authority to their state police forces. The Penn-
sylvania States Police routinely assist the state corrections system during emergencies.
173. Lauter, The Plunge into 'Private Justice', NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 1985, at 1, col. !.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) provides that: Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
175. Id. Supporters of private corrections rely on the potential immunity of private prov-
iders as a major selling point.
176. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)
(per curiam); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
177. See supra note 176.
178. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
179. See supra note 174.
180. See supra note 178.
181. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
ees who violate an individual's fourth amendment rights while acting
under color of federal law.
182
To date, only one case has addressed the issue of whether a pri-
vate company and government officials may be liable for violating
the constitutional rights of private facility detainees. In Medina v.
O'Neill,'8" twenty-six Columbian stowaways were discovered on a
ship docked in the Port of Houston. Customarily, stowaways are de-
tained by the carrier and returned to their country of origin. How-
ever, since it was impractical for the ship to retain custody of so
many stowaways, 184 Paul O'Neill, District Director of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS), granted permission to tempo-
rarily detain the stowaways off the vessel.
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Sixteen aliens were placed in the custody of Danner, Inc. (Dan-
ner), a private security firm providing ship crew transportation and
watchmen for the Port of Houston.'86 Danner had previously de-
tained aliens in two cells at the company's office. One cell measured
twelve-by-twelve feet and was designed to hold two people. The sec-
ond cell, measuring twelve-by-twenty feet, was designed to hold
six.1 87 All sixteen aliens were placed in the second cell.' 88 During an
escape attempt on the second day of detention, the Danner guards
accidentally shot and killed one alien and wounded another. 189
The ACLU filed a Bivens action against Danner and the INS
officials, alleging violations of the aliens' fifth amendment rights. 90
The plaintiffs asserted that INS had a duty to oversee the detention
and that its failure to do so constituted state action. Although the
INS defendants argued that there was no state action because the
aliens were in the custody of private actors and the injuries arose
from private acts, 19' the court concluded that state action existed on
the part of all defendants. INS employees O'Neill and Jensen or-
dered the stowaways' detention; without the order, the ship's captain
182. See id.
183. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.Tex. 1984).
184. Id. at 1031. The ship had no spare quarters or holding cells for detention. Also, the
captain was concerned that the large number of Columbians posed a security threat.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1039.
187. Id. at 1031. Each cell was equipped with a wash basin, toilet, bunk beds, table and
chairs. The larger cell also had a sofa bed.
188. Id. Danner representatives testified that the aliens preferred to stay together, and
that they were given clothing, bedding, showers and three meals daily. However, at least ten
did not have beds and they were provided no recreation or exercise. The Danner facility was
neither inspected nor regulated by INS.
189. Id. at 1032. Danner's guards were not trained in the use of firearms.
190. Id. at 1042. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that detained
aliens are entitled to fifth amendment due process. The Medina plaintiffs claimed they were
deprived of life and liberty because the conditions of their confinement violated minimally
acceptable conditions of confinement.
191. Id. at 1040.
would not have been able to place them on land.19 The court found
that Danner was a state actor because Danner exercised the powers
of immigration and detention, powers traditionally reserved to the
government, and exclusive prerogatives of the state. 193
Upon review of relevant statutes, the court found that Congress
had authorized detention of aliens in many circumstances, with the
INS assuming responsibility for the detention. 19' The court thus con-
cluded that, since INS is a governmental agency, Congress intended
it to furnish detention facilities which comply with minimum due
process standards. 95 After examining the acceptable constitutional
standards for incarceration, the court held that the conditions of the
plaintiffs' confinement violated the fifth amendment.1 96 Furthermore,
the federal defendants' qualified immunity defense failed because
their actions violated clearly established law. 197 Thus, both Danner
and the INS officials were liable for the constitutional violations. 98
Although Medina's facts are unlikely to arise in a private prison
arrangement with a state or local government, it warrants close at-
tention. While INS neither approved the aliens' placement in Dan-
ner's custody nor inspected or licensed the facility,' 99 INS' sanction-
ing of the aliens' removal and off-ship detention constituted state
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1038. This doctrine is referred to as the "public function" line of the state
action requirement for Bivens and section 1983 actions. Immigration is a fundamental sover-
eign attribute exercised exclusively by the legislative and executive branches of the United
States Government. The Medina court found state action because Congress required action by
INS and the private carrier. See supra note 185. The court also found state action on the basis
of the private actor's exercise of the power of detention. The United States Supreme Court has
held that "while as a factual matter any person with sufficient physical power may deprive a
person of his [life, liberty or] property only a state or private person whose action 'may fairly
be treated as that of the state itself,' . . . may deprive him of 'an interest encompassed within
the [Fifth or] Fourteenth Amendment's protection, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84, 92 S.
Ct. 1983, 1996, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556 (1972).'" Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157
(1978) (cite omitted).
194. Medina, 589 F. Supp. at 1040. Congress also explicitly provided that detention
expenses were the responsibility of private carriers. Id.
195. Id.
196. id. at 1040, 1041. The court stated that minimum constitutional standards for in-
mates require, that the number of inmates not exceed the design capacity of the facility, that
each inmate be given a bed off the floor with a clean mattress and clean linen, that prisoners
be given three meals per day and be fed outside of their cells, that they be given adequate
opportunity for physical recreation, and that staff be given appropriate and effective training.
The court found that the cell in which the plaintiffs were placed was overcrowded with no
window. Ten individuals slept on the floor, they were fed in the cell and were held therein for
24 hours a day without opportunity for exercise. Finally, the guards were not trained.
197. Id. at 1041. Federal and state officials are entitled to qualified immunity for consti-
tutional torts committed while exercising official discretion, if the acts were within the scope of
the official's powers. If the defense is established, plaintiffs must prove that the defendants'
actions violated clearly established law in order to overcome the immunity. This immunity is
not available to private individuals. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
198. As a consequence of the litigation, Danner settled for an undisclosed sum and is no
longer offering its facility for detentions. The INS officials are appealing. Lauter, The Plunge
Into 'Private Justice', NAT'L L. J., Mar. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
199. See supra note 185.
action. Private prisons envisioned by New Mexico's statute and
Pennsylvania's enabling legislation will be operating under govern-
ment approval, inspection, and licensure, a scheme which establishes
a stronger nexus than that found in Medina. As a result, both pri-
vate providers and contracting governments will be subject to section
1983 liability. 20 0 As the ACLU cautioned Pennsylvania state officials
in its testimony before the Pennsylvania House Judiciary
Committee:
First, state officials who must oversee private prison operations
will be liable for the injuries inflicted at the hands of those
granted licenses whose track records indicate brutality or other
unfitness with regards to prisoner handling. Second, even where
there are adequate safeguards concerning the granting of private
prison licensure state officials will also be liable should they fail
to inspect for and take corrective measures of those prison con-
ditions which violate prisoners Eighth amendment rights to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. Either of these scena-
rios will implicate the state treasury as the United States Su-
preme Court specifically stated in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978), that attorneys' fees arising out of civil rights litigation
against state officials must be paid from the state treasury. It is
not uncommon for fees in this kind of litigation to exceed six
and occasionally seven figures."°'
The ACLU also cautioned that it is not clear whether states
may delegate the operation of prisons to private parties. Tradition-
ally, incarceration has been an exclusive state function. The United
States Constitution protects individuals from the deprivation of life,
liberty, and property without due process of law. Numerous United
States Supreme Court decisions have clearly enunciated these rights,
and governments, bound by these decisions, must provide the requi-
site services and procedures regardless of economic consideration. In-
troduction of a profit motive in prison operations raises the possibil-
ity that attempts to maximize economic returns will impinge upon
these constitutionally mandated services and procedures.
200. While private prison statutes and contracts may require private contractors to as-
sume the cost of such litigation, governments' protection is dependent upon the sufficiency of
the private contractor's liability insurance. Because the private prison field is so new, evidence
of private prison contractors' ability to obtain liability insurance is sparce. The Corrections
Corporation of America is unwilling to disclose its carrier. Corrections experts express concern
that private prison operators' experiences may mirror those of municipalities currently facing
crises in insurance coverage.
201. House Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Stefan Presser, Legal Director of the
American Civil Services Union of Pennsylvania). Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1979) held
that an award of attorneys' fees to be paid out of a state's Department of Correction funds did
not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from retroactive monetary relief. An
award of attorneys' fees serves the same purpose as a remedial fine for civil contempt, which,
as a form of prospective injunctive relief, is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
VII. Conclusion
Privitization proponents promise to alleviate overcrowding, close
down archaic facilities, minimize inmate lawsuits and union
problems, and decrease management headaches. Private prisons are
not, however, a panacea. Many factors such as liability, the need for
oversight and regulation, and the danger of over-reliance on the pri-
vate sector counsel hesitation. Many of our nation's prisons could be
run more effectively and efficiently and the private sector can pro-
vide these services. Governments which decide to follow the trend
toward privitization must ensure, however, that private involvement
in corrections neither interferes with nor sacrifices inmates' constitu-
tional rights.

